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Explotación Infantil: Yerba Mate (Sud-América)

2020.08.02 16:19 kong-dao Explotación Infantil: Yerba Mate (Sud-América)

La explotación laboral infantil no es cosa nueva, existe hace más de 100 años, quizás desde aquellas remotas épocas de conquistas imperialistas que subyugaron al "nuevo mundo" bajo las insignias de "liberar" a quienes ya eran libres.
En Sud-America (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay y Brasil) hay una infución ampliamente consumida: la yerba mate
Actualmente, Argentina es el mayor exportador mundial de este producto, el 60% sale de la provincia de Misiones, mundialmente conocida por tener una de las "7 Maravillas del Mundo", las Cataratas del Iguazú. Pero no todo es tan "maravilloso" en esta provincia, este año (2020) la ONG "Un sueño para Misiones" volvió a reavivar un fuego casi extinto y olvidado en la "famosa" región, el trabajo infantil en las plantaciones de yerba mate.
Como sucede en las plantaciones de café y cacao, el trabajo de menores en países en vías de desarrollo (o "tercer mundistas") se da por una situación socio-económica que impide a los padres y madres ganar el suficiente capital para poder alimentar la boca de sus hijos, haciendo que los niño dejen el colegio (estudios) para ir a las plantaciones de yerba mate, es decir, percibir una remuneración o capital por su esfuerzo físico, conocido como trabajo.
Tarefero/a es el nombre que recibe la persona cosechadora y colectora en las platanciones de yerba mate, su labor consiste en cultivar, cosechar y recolectar la yerba mate en las tierras del productor (dueño de la tierra, o, terrateniente) para que luego, por medio de diferentes loǵisticas, llegue a la góndola local o internacional (exportación) La forma en la que el obrero es transportado de su casa a la plantación, no es la más segura, en 2013 saltó el resorte cuando ocho personas murieron por haber desbarrancado el camión que los transportaba, dos de ellos tenían 12 años y otro 14.
El diario digitla Misiones.com describe en su articulo fechado el 22 de Junio de 2013:
Según el testimonio de sobrevivientes, al notar que el camión corría descontrolado cuesta abajo, el padre de Fernando Santiago (12 años) abrazó al chico y lo protegió como pudo, con su propio cuerpo.
El periódico digital Infoberdigital.com también se hizo eco del hecho redactando:
Cabe recordar que los 24 tareferos que se transportaban en el camión Ford F-7000 que volcó en la ruta 220 a 400 metros de Salto Encantado, estaban todos contratados en negro. De estos, al menos 10 eran niños –dos fallecieron esta semana y las víctimas fatales llegaron a ocho.
Ese mismo año la sociologa Maria Luz Roa publicó en una revista científica Tarefa que me hiciste sufrir...La emocionalidad en la constitución del self de los jóvenes de familias tareferas un detallado escríto (21 pág) sobre la situación de familias en las plantaciones de yerba mate.
En 2014, la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Escuela de Artes, Departamente de Cine y televisión hizo un documental de 16 min, entrevistando a tareferos y maestros sobre el trabajo infantil en las plantaciones y los causas de analfabetismo que genera en los niños.
A finales del 2015 las ONG Change.org, Posibl.com y "Un Sueño para Misiones" se armaron de valor para hacer un documental de 30 min, denunciando la situación que viven muchos niños en el país Suramericano. El primer periódico que repitió el mensaje fue La Nación, que en Enero 2016, publicaría Cómo es el trabajo infantil en la cosecha de yerba mate tratando de concientizar a la población local sobre la falta de derechos humanos que hay detrás de la infusión nacional más popular:
(...) durante el rodaje del documental pudieron comprobar la desigualdad, desprotección y los riesgos a los que se enfrentan cada día los niños de las familias que trabajan en la tarefa (...) Los chicos no tienen acceso a la educación, toman agua contaminada y, en algunos casos, se instalan con sus familias en el yerbal y se pasan hasta 22 días sin baño. Hay un imaginario que no tiene un correlato con la realidad, con lo que allí se sufre y con la falta de igualdad. La mayoría, aseguran, comienza a trabajar entre los 4 y los 10 años. Comen reviro como plato principal hasta dos veces por día [que no es otra cosa que una pasta de harina, agua y sal, tipo torta frita] y están en contacto con agroquímicos y herramientas peligrosas para su edad y su salud. La mayoría no va a la escuela, y el tiempo para jugar casi no existe
9 meses más tarde el mismo periódico no quería dejar el tema en el olvido y sacó otro articulo nombrado El trabajo infantil: un monstruo escondido entre los yerbales
En 2016 María Luz Roa comentaría:
“La problemática de los tareferos es que hay subcontratación de la mano de obra en la cadena de producción de la yerba mate. En Misiones, los dueños del yerbal son en su mayoría colonos, propietarios de lo que sería un "farmer" en lenguaje sociológico, un mediano productor. La contratación es a través de intermediarios y la mayor parte de lo que sería esa mano de obra, de lo que sería ese mercado de trabajo, está en negro. Se trabaja a través de campamentos que se instalan a los bordes de los yerbales, con sistemas de enganche donde el contratista les adelanta mercadería y después el tarefero queda endeudado. A su vez el trabajo de la tarefa es a destajo, o sea por cantidad cosechada, entonces si llueve no se cosecha, depende también de la calidad del yerbal” (...) Raído son los bolsones donde se cosecha la yerba mate; cosecha que es manual, todavía no se mecanizó, entonces se hace con tijera o con cuchillo, y se concentra esa yerba en los raídos, y eso se carga en los hombros de la persona, hace unos años empezaron a implementar unos carritos, pero es un trabajo sumamente sufrido (...) Lo que sucede es que se envejece muy precozmente –especificó–, un tarefero tiene una vida útil en la cosecha hasta los 40 y pico de años, después generalmente se accidenta, tiene problemas en la espalda, en las rodillas, en las articulaciones (...) entonces de esa manera los pibes desde edades tempranas empiezan a ir [a tarefear]"
Pero en Argentina no es el único país en que se da el trabajo infantil, aquel mismo año (2016), el gobierno de Paraguay publicó resultados representativos de la Encuesta de actividades de niños, niñas y adolescentes de las zonas rurales para el año 2015. En la encuesta, se estima que 301.827 niños de entre 5 y 17 años de edad realizan trabajo peligroso en las zonas rurales y de los cuales 3.464 se encuentran en campos de yerba mate.
Algunos medios de comunicación internacionales pusieron énfasis en concientizar a la sociedad sobre la explotación de menores, por ejemplo, la BBC (Inglaterra) publicó un informe sobre lo acontecido en 2013 titulado Trabajo infantil: el trago amargo del mate, la bebida nacional argentina redactando:
El cosechero es el eslabón más débil en la cadena del mate. Un hombre que recoja 700 kilos, en promedio, puede ganar 350 pesos argentinos, unos US$25 por día. "Recibimos 0,75 centavos de peso por cada kilo de hoja verde, pero hoy solo una bolsa de harina cuesta 250 pesos (US$18)"
Otro periódico internacional que se sumó a la denuncia contra el trabajo infantil fue El Mundo (España) bajo el titulo Los niños, el estigma del mate y también El Nuevo Herald (Estados Unidos) con el titular Se destapa trabajo infantil en los campos de yerba mate en Argentina
El año siguiente (2017) La Nación volvió a la carga con un informe titulado ¿Sabías que el mate esconde trabajo infantil? pero la repercución internacional fue un ruido silencioso, tímidamente se la CNN (Estados Unidos) fue uno de los que se aventuró a recalcar la situación con un breve informe titulado El trabajo infantil y la pobreza detrás de la yerba mate que consumimos
Ya en 2017 las propuestas para modificar las leyes en Argentina contra la explotación infantil remetieron contra los magisterios sin éxito más no sin olvido.
En 2020, tras tres años de silencio mediático y político, el periódico Norte de Corrientes volvio a denunciar que:
En San Carlos, los inspectores constataron trabajadores de cultivo y cosecha de yerba mate sin su correspondiente Libreta de Trabajo Rural (aun cuando se encuentran declarados y registrados en AFIP) y con remuneraciones por debajo de lo que marca la ley. Conforme surge de la fiscalización, el empleador declaró en los recibos menor cantidad de días de labor, en una actividad que no se detuvo durante la pandemia de COVID-19. (...) los inspectores detectaron 4 adolescentes de 16 y 17 años en la cosecha de yerba mate -uno de los cuales no se encuentra escolarizado-
Mientras tanto varios medicos de la provincia de Misiones publicaban varias notas sobre el accidente que sufireron 20 tareferos al viajar en un trasnporte inseguro que terminó por cobrarse otra vida:
Alarcón [fallecido] viajaba con otros 19 trabajadores –entre ellos, un menor de 16 años – en una combi que no estaba habilitada para el transporte de pasajeros y que de hecho, no disponía de asientos o cinturones de seguridad
Actualmente (2020) los tareferos deben cosechar 18 toneladas de yerba por mes para no ser pobres, trabajan entre 12 y 14 horas por día, mientras el kilo de yerba se vende a (aproximadamente) $200, a los tareferos les pagan $1,5 (un peso con cincuenta) por kilo cosechado y sólo el 20% de los tareferos cobra un subsidio que era de $2300 hasta fines del año pasado (últimos datos actualizados).
Según la BBC, este año, Siria se convierte en el mayor comprador o importador de yerba mate a nivel mundial.

Soluciones que se pueden plantear al problema:
Igual que con el café, el cacao, la yerba mate es un producto que debe ser consumido, es decir, comprado con capital ganado producto del esfuerzo, por lo que primeramente la solución más fácil podría ser dejar de consumirlo puesto que es una forma de desincentivar la explotación infantil, aunque, claro está, que muchos no van a dejar el círculo vicioso del consumismo, por lo que se deben proponer alternativas. La modificación de las leyes contra la esclavitud de menores debe ser tomada en serio por los países productores, las entidades gubernamentales conocen en detalle la condición precaria en la que se encuentran muchos niños y niñas, saben que bajo su gobierno y su "techo" se están cometiendo injusticias y no hacen mucho para cambiarlo, es por esto que como individuos debemos tomar acciones contra las grandes corporaciones o terratenientes que siguen beneficiandose de una plusvalía inmerecida. La justicia social debe llegar primero a los padres, no con planes sociales, sino con trabajos dignos, salarios justos que le permitan pagar la comida de sus hijos, la salud de ellos y de los suyos, de forma que esos jóvenes puedan enfocar su mente en estudiar y jugar. Dentro de los derechos humanos universales se encuentran: salud, educación y una vivienda digna, un combo que no existe entre las quimeras plantaciones de café, cacao y yerba mate. Los trabajadores no quieren ser mantenidos, quieren que se respeten estos derechos, humanos y universales, son derechos que todas las personas merecen, no solamente los "civilizados" urbanitas, ellos mismos lo dicen en el documental que puede encontrar en este link.
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2020.03.19 10:16 LordVelaryon [Translation] The Libero's murderer: how Arrigo Sacchi revolutionized tactics and built the best team of all times.

-"How was Italian football before Sacchi?" -"Like now."
Just two words are enough for Arrigo Sacchi to disarm your face-to-face strategy and leave you out of the game like a beginner. Three words that, however, do not strictly correspond to reality. They are only half true. Only by digging deep into his footballing imagination can one discover how the man who built one of the greatest teams of all time is able to disregard his legacy and blur it in the timeline of the evolution of the beautiful game in Italy. Despite his modesty, there is no doubt that Arrigo Sacchi and his Milan team mark a turning point for Italian football, although from the manager's point of view it is not a turning point but a mere parenthesis. Italian football changed during his time on the bench, but recovered its natural course as soon as he stepped off the pitch and into the offices. "Clearly there has been some change, but not like in the rest of Europe. The televisions have made us see that a different kind of football is being played. 'They've changed all over the world except in Italy,' Costacurta told me a few years ago when we were watching the Italian U-21s against Denmark," explains Sacchi. What are the reasons for this lack of evolution in Italian football? Sacchi is able to recite them with the confidence with which a surgeon points out the ills to be removed. "In Italy, you don't know what the merit is, you just want to win. The fans and the journalists don't ask for the show or the fun, they ask for the victory. -And then how do we seek this victory? -We seek it in the way we know best, through cunning or the art of achieving what we set out to do. Then, our football is a football that costs to be updated and to evolve". Like a wharf which, however much you stretch, returns to its original form, Italian football always tends towards its most primal concepts. And to find the origin of those concepts, you have to do some archaeological work until you get back to the embryonic stage of football in Italy.
World football is roughly divided into four schools. First we have the direct style which was born in England and is still representative of British teams nowadays. Then we have the cheerful, colourful and lighthearted way of life that the Brazilians have been able to bring to the pitch to the height of artistic movement. Thirdly, there is the Dutch philosophy. The so-called total football with which Rinus Michels overtook Herbert Chapman's WM team to surprise the world, generating an idea of play that still has imitators, as is the case of Barcelona in recent times. Finally, we find the Italian style, baptized under the term of Catenaccio, which means lock in Italian. A nomenclature, by the way, quite illustrative of the ideals of the game. In its most basic concepts, the Italian is a football mostly defensive and disciplined, where the result prevails over any commitment to aesthetics. In line with Niccolò Machiavelli's 'Prince' ("the end justifies the means"), Italian football has always assumed that anything is permissible as long as victory is achieved.
Ironically, Catenaccio has no Italian parents. It is not clear who invented this style, but none of those who claim paternity were born in Italy. According to the accomplished historian Brian Glanville, the Catenaccio was invented by the Austrian coach Karl Rappan during the first half of the 20th century. In the 1940s, Rappan developed a tactic that the press christened Riegel (lock, in German) and consisted of having one of the five men on the WM front line move in behind the three defenders. The job of this sweeper would be to keep an eye on the opposing forwards who were running away from their marker. Helenio Herrera, however, not only proclaimed himself the inventor of the Catenaccio but claimed to be the first player to play the role of a sweeper. "It occurred to me when I was playing in France," explains the Argentine coach, as Simon Kuper relates in Football Against the Enemy. "We were playing with the WM formation then," continues Mago Herrera, "and in a game where we were winning 1-0 with 15 minutes to go, I left my position to get behind the defense. I had these ideas in my time as a player and when I became a manager years later I remembered them." Glanville believes Rappan invented the Catenaccio, Nereo Rocco introduced it to Italy and Helenio Herrera perfected it. Whether it was one or the other who invented it, both versions agree that the key piece of this style is the figure of the Libero. Without it, there would be no Catenaccio.
The success of the ultra-defensive Inter Milan during the 1960s, which razed Europe to the ground with two consecutive European Cups (1964 and 1965), made the Catenaccio the book that rested on the bedside table of any self-respecting Italian coach. Anyone who wanted to win had to resort to defensive football. Nereo Rocco's triumphs with Milan in the late 1960s and Giovanni Trapattoni's triumphs with Juventus in the 1980s did not invite the idea of an alternative. That was the context in which a discreet footballer who had not managed to get out of the lower ranks of Italian football decided to hang up his boots to become a coach. At just 26, Arrigo Sacchi sat on the bench for the first time. At Baracca Lugo, a team in the neighbourhood where he worked as a shoemaker. "I was 26, my goalkeeper was 39 and my striker was 32. I had to win them" It was the start of a rise to the elite with stops at Bellaria and Rimini and the youth teams of Cesena and Fiorentina. But fate awaited him at Parma, with whom he would achieve promotion to Serie B in just one season and leave him three points behind the top flight of Italian football. During that season, a 1986-1987 Italian Cup play-off would change his life forever. He would beat AC Milan by the smallest of margins, playing a game that caught the eye of the Rossoneri's top executive. It was on that night that Silvio Berlusconi was enthralled by Arrigo Sacchi.

01. "The birth of Sacchi's Milan"

Silvio Berlusconi had recently became the owner of Milan. After a failed attempt to take over Inter Milan, he ended up buying the Rossoneri on 20 February 1986, ready to build the best team in the world. Although Milan did not seem to be the most suitable club to do so. The golden years when Europe was painted in red and black had already long survived only in the history books. In the early 1980s, Milan was going through its most traumatic period. Former president Felice Colombo, members of his board and some players were involved in the 'Caso Totonero' (blackjack), the illegal betting and match fixing scandal that rocked Italian football in the 1979-1980 season. As a result, Milan were administratively relegated to Serie B and began a dark period from which they could not escape. Despite the arrival of stars such as Paolo Rossi, top scorer in the 1982 World Cup in Spain, or the hiring of symbols such as Nils Liedholm to the bench, Milan did not get off the ground again. Berlusconi would become the end of Rossoneri's troubles. He took over from Giuseppe Farina in the presidency, brought optimism to the stands, millions to the coffers and, above all, a new philosophy for the team. He set himself the goal of becoming the best club in the world by always opting for attacking football that would be attractive to fans. To achieve this ambitious goal, he relied on the coach he had fallen in love with when he faced him in the Italian Cup. He trusted Arrigo Sacchi.
An unknown, with no past as a footballer, he was in charge of one of the most successful teams in Europe, making front-page coverage in the Italian press. The headslines that considered Berlusconi's gamble to be wrong were multiplying. They accused him of losing his mind. It was too shocking that someone who had not previously been a professional footballer should take over one of the giants of Italian football. That was the first obstacle Sacchi encountered in his promotion to the elite. It was a rare thing at the time. Ottavio Bianchi coached Napoli, Rino Marchesi coached Juventus, both of whom had a history with the Italian national team, and the illustrious Giovanni Trappatoni, who was a European champion in Rossoneri colours, sat on the Inter Milan bench. However, Milan's fate was in the hands of a rookie who was not known for his footballing skills. Replacing a myth like Liedholm didn't make things any easier either. Sacchi defended himself as his Milan would later, knocking out the critics with a simple phrase: "I didn't know that to become a jockey, you first have to be a horse".
Despite the doubts of the surroundings, there was total confidence in Arrigo Sacchi at the club. Silvio Berlusconi gave his new manager full powers to build a team to suit him. "My work at Milan is made possible by a great club. A club that was positively impressed by what I did at Parma, that believed in a few things and followed me completely. They even threw out some players who were undoubtedly valuable, but who were not functional and others who were not professionally as I wanted them to be," says the Italian coach. Sacchi does not give out any names so as not to reveal the identity of these non-functional or unprofessional players, but to draw your own conclusions you need only look at the list of players who left Milan that summer in 1987. Agostino Di Bartolomei set out for Cesena despite being the player who had played the most matches the previous season. Dario Bonetti, Ray Wilkins and Mark Hateley, among others, followed the same path.
But the key of that summer was not in the departures, but in the arrivals. Sacchi marked a clear line in the transfer policy. "I believed in ideas and work," says the Italian coach, "and to do this I needed to have reliable people, people who were enthusiastic, generous, a culture of professionalism, perfectionists, and we looked for these kinds of people. Then, that they were functional to the technical project we had in mind and that they were complementary to each other." It was within these parameters that Sacchi brought Walter Bianchi and Roberto Mussi with him from Parma, requested the signing of Carlo Ancelotti and was given two top stars by Silvio Berlusconi's checkbook: Marco van Basten and Ruud Gullit. The former arrived from Ajax in exchange for 1.75 million euros. For the second, 13.5 million was paid to PSV Eindhoven. Both would become the totemic symbols of their Milan. "Van Basten was the best, but Gullit was the emblem. Without being the best he was the one who helped me the most", Sacchi confesses. Together, they formed the basis of the team along with promising youngsters such as Paolo Maldini, Franco Baresi and Roberto Donadoni. Frank Rijkaard, the Holy Trinity's companion from the Rossoneri tulips, was not due to arrive in Milan until the following summer.
After a summer of avoiding criticism and disdain while transmitting to some heavyweights that they should make the suitcase, Sacchi managed to build his Milan and this had its first test in official match in the Coppa d'Italia against Bari. The business card could not have been better. The Rossoneri won 5-0 with goals from Donadoni, Virdis, Van Basten, Gullit and Massaro, and that 23 August 1987 has become a holy day in the history of Milan. It was the moment when the team that changed the destiny of the entity was born. Three days later it would beat Como, then Monza, and then make its Serie A debut with a win over Pisa. Milan had become a machine, from the beginning, that was very difficult to stop. Disappointments such as the early elimination from the UEFA Cup against Espanyol and some unexpected results injected doubts in Berlusconi, who even flirted with Johan Cruyff to give him the Rossoneri bench, but negotiations with the Dutchman did not bear fruit. Sacchi held on to his position and ended up building one of the best teams in history.

02. Milan's tactical analysis.

Sacchi's avant-garde ideas were the reconstruction of tactical values not only in Milan and Italian football, but also had a great impact on the world stage. His tactics marked a complete break with the style that was being imposed in Italy and, therefore, also in Europe. It was a tactical revolution and, as such, it required some sacrifice. Marat's death set fire to the French revolution and the assassination of Martin Luther King accelerated his 'dream'. For his own revolution, Arrigo Sacchi murdered the Libero. The Libero represented the icon of the Catenaccio, the figure with which the hitherto unquestionable WM formation was overthrown to create a new style in which defensive concepts were varied. "Italy has a defensive mentality in general, not just in football. For centuries everyone was invading us. When I arrived, most of the attention was on the defensive phase. We had a libero and a line of markers. The offensive phase was left to the intelligence and common sense of the only creative element in the team, the number 10," he says in 'Inverting The Pyramid'.
Sacchi changed everything. He abolished the law of the sweeper to form a very forward four-man defensive line that was perfectly synchronised to zonal marking and managing offside when necessary. Franco Baresi was in charge of the back line and marked the line over which the rest of the defence was to be deployed. Such a forward defensive line meant that spaces were reduced, providing a key safety net for the other two lines to push the opposition's ball out of their control. Thus, if an opposing player crossed a line, he immediately crashed into the next one. "We wanted to get the ball back as quickly as possible," says Sacchi, as if it were the simplest thing in the world. However, every move of that pressure was totally studied. To the extent that there was a false pressure, like the striker: "Sometimes we practised a false pressure. We pretended to put pressure, but in reality we used that time to recover our strength".
That kind of defensive work was the first necessary condition for a footballing bet that depended solely and exclusively on ruling the game through possession. Without the ball there was no plan. So it was necessary to get it back as soon as possible. In a way, it was a reinvention of Rinus Michels' total football. "We had the presumption, also the hope, of knowing how to do everything. We wanted to get the ball away from our opponents quickly and when we had it, we wanted to know when to have possession or when to play a vertical game. We defended by attacking, by running forward," explains Sacchi, "and when we had the ball we knew when we had to play upright or, on the contrary, when to pass backwards, change sides." As he talks about his tactical ideals, Sacchi seems to have moved into the dressing room for a moment. He looks down, forgets about the camera, the focus and even the journalist in front of him, and stands in front of an imaginary team he's coaching before a game or during a training session. He speaks without resting. Having a tactical conversation with Sacchi is the perfect metaphor for the game that Milan played on the field: he takes possession, monopolises the words and leaves hardly any space for the interlocutor to interact. He is the unequivocal master of the dialogue and one can only shut up, listen and learn. "We trained believing that pressure was important because it allowed us to grow our self-esteem and personality and impose on others a rhythm of play they were not used to. We also tried to condition them when they had the ball. But when we had the ball we had to know how to manage it and understand if it was time to play vertically or start again with the ball, change the game or change the zone. It was a team that I think knew everything and was played by excellent performers, with a great club behind them. We had the interpreters and they were all functional. For me, they were the best players in the world, all 18 of them. I knew that wasn't the case, but I wouldn't have swapped them for anyone else," he concludes, before taking a breath. By way of false pressure, we intuited.
Paradoxically, that Milan that needed the ball so much to represent their football ideas on the field, often worked out without it. The ball was not a usual assistant in Milanello, training center of the Milan team. Sometimes, Arrigo Sacchi designed purely theoretical work sessions in which the players did not even need to jump onto the field. At other times, he encouraged positional play and Sacchi forced his disciples to show him where they should be on the pitch depending on where an imaginary ball was. The coach would walk around the pitch and the players would have to correct their position with millimetric precision. His tactics revolutionised Italian football to the point where the foundations of the game were called into question. Italian teams were divided internally according to the characteristics of their players. Some had the responsibility to defend and others were in charge of attacking, being exempt from running backwards. With Sacchi, although this had already happened with Michels, both parties merged to reward the block. They all ran to get the ball back and they all represented basic pieces in the creation of attacking football. With Sacchi came the supremacy of the group over the individual in the Serie A.

03. Opera Prima

Sacchi's Milan reached its peak in the European Cup. During his time on the Rossoneri bench he gave Silvio Berlusconi a Scudetto, an Italian Super Cup, two European Super Cups, two Intercontinental Cups and, above all, two European Cups. But, above the titles, key moments are remembered, matches in which Milan was consecrated as one of the best teams of all times. Probably one of those matches was the one that pitted them against Real Madrid in the semi-finals of the 1988-1989 European Cup. Sacchi was facing his second season at the head of Milan. After winning Serie A, he had to export his success to Europe, where Berlusconi's most coveted ambition lay: the European Cup. After beating Bulgaria's Vitosha Sofia (2-7 on aggregate), Red Star on penalties and Werder Bremen with a solitary goal from Marco van Basten in the second leg, he would face Real Madrid in the semi-finals. Although the Merengue players barely remembered those European Cups that Di Stefano won in black-and-white television, they had brought together a generation that had been thrilling the stands: the Quinta del Buitre. The Butragueños, Michel and company were joining international stars like Hugo Sanchez to dream again with the trophy with big ears. There was plenty of talent in Madrid and it was, along with Milan, the fashionable team in Europe. It was unquestionable that the Spanish capital smelled of the Seventh, but the first leg generated doubts. After 90 minutes, the score was a 1-1 draw, but the feeling was very different. Sacchi remembers it clearly and confesses that even Butragueño recognized to him years later that he did not know how they had obtained that draw in the Bernabéu. "Butragueño told me when I was at Real Madrid - when he was vice-president and had been a great player since he was little and therefore knew everything about Real Madrid - that he had never seen in his life, having followed football and having played it, "a team that came to the Bernabeu to do what you did. We managed to recover a draw not knowing how. You looked like twenty and we looked like ten or eleven. You attacked even Buyo", recounts the Italian.
The key to Milan's dominance in Madrid was once again pressure, the hallmark of Sacchi's Milan. Such was the superiority shown by the visitors that, when adding up an insufficient result, the Milan players went into a state of depression. Sacchi had to work as a psychologist to lift the spirits of his team and show them the way to seal their qualification for the European Cup final. "I remember that in the following 15 days I was telling the players: 'Remember that at certain levels, when you have to win and you don't win, you lose nine times out of ten. So either we make a masterpiece or we lose here". That work of motivation was the first stone to build what later has been considered the Opera Prima of Milan. Milan has given three artistic jewels to the world: the Scala, the Duomo and the Manita to Real Madrid. Milan came back with a 5-0 win at the San Siro, although things did not start off well. So much that as soon as the match got underway, Sacchi considered removing his main star Marco van Basten from the field. "When they came here, Madrid started well, we didn't start so well; van Basten was static, so much so that I immediately got a striker warming up. I remember Ramaccioni saying to me: 'Arrigo, calm down a bit'," said Sacchi. Then came the stroke of genius. All it took was a tactical move and the game changed in favour of the Rossoneri. Carlo Ancelotti was the embodiment of the strategy. To find the origin, you have to go back a few days before the meeting. "Carlo unlocked everything," analyses Sacchi, "and that's how I see football. On Tuesday, Evani had been injured in a clash with Albertini; because we trained on Tuesday as if it was already the match, with that strength. I had many solutions to replace him: to put Donadoni as a winger, who although many journalists put him there, we didn't use as a winger. We used him as a midfielder, the fourth central player, because if he ended up on the right or left wing, he bothered the wings, which were Evani and Colombo. Or putting Virdis in attack with Van Basten and Gullit as a midfielder in Donadoni's place, but Gullit didn't guarantee me on a tactical level what Donadoni guaranteed me... In the end I played the player least likely to replace Evani, who was Ancelotti, but he was the most available and gave me his 100%."
The gamble proved to be perfect: "The prize was that the first goal was scored by Ancelotti. And then he played the final in that position too. What did the Steaua coach do? He put Hagi in that area, but he didn't know that we never had a marker, we had two or three, because our team was, in that way, compact, short in that period of time compared to the others, but we were always going to mark with two or three men. And this happened against Real Madrid, where we had a numerical superiority in the pressure on the ball." Sacchi believes that the basis of the victory over Real Madrid was, as it was throughout his career, the importance of the team over the individuals. "They had players with great technique, probably better than us, but we were a great team. They had a group, but less of a team than we did. And in football the collective achieves more than the individual. You have to know this," says the Italian. That victory marks the definitive explosion of Milan, who went on to become the dominant force in European football.
After that, they won the Intercontinental Cup against Nacional de Medellin and went on to reach the footballing heavens. However, that match also represented the change in the way teams faced Milan. The Colombians were the first daring ones who forced Arrigo's thoughts to change. "With Nacional of Medellin they were the ones who made things difficult for us because for the first time we were up against a team that attacked us a lot. Then, of hunters we became hunted. It took us tranquility, security. This requires patience, which is a virtue I have not always had, but at that time I had it. I remember that at half-time Van Basten said to me: 'We are not well, we are not in shape, we have to have patience'. It wasn't a pretty game, but I was amazed at how many people said it was bad. Those people never understood that Milan were playing great football. I have to say that it was a game similar to reading a Kafka book: heavy, difficult," says Sacchi for El Enganche about that 1-0 win for Evani in the last minute of extra time, which represented the club's second Intercontinental and the first one to be shown in his living room. Milan, however, were already a despotic side who had challenged the previously dominant footballing laws and turned them to their advantage.

04. Gullit vs Van Basten, angel vs demon.

Despite the successes achieved with his Milan, Arrigo Sacchi was not lacking detractors. His style was so far removed from Italian traditions that some were unable to digest the change. "Even now it is said that when Milan played well it was because they had good players and when they played badly it was because Sacchi was there," joked the Italian coach, seeking complicity. Gianni Brera, the legendary Italian sports journalist, was one of his fiercest critics. Brera, an exquisite connoisseur of football and tactics, professed admiration for a doctrine that was antithetical to that represented by Sacchi's Milan. His attacks on the ideas of the revolutionary coach were commonplace in the Gazzetta dello Sport. Although Arrigo was intelligent to take advantage of these criticisms and reverse them in his favour. Before the 1989 European Cup final against Steaua Bucharest, he used an article by Brera to motivate his players. "I remember before the final with Steaua, that the greatest Italian sports critic, the poor Brera, an excellent writer, very good indeed, but with footballing ideas very distant from ours, said: 'Milan will play against the champions of dancing football, against the champions of possession of the ball, they will have to wait for it, defend it and go on the counterattack'. On Tuesday before the match the best Italian sports journalist wrote this and I read it because I needed to know his convictions. You cannot say 'do it because I say so'. According to him, we had to use that strategy. Gullit stood up and said 'we'll attack them from the first second until we have the forces. Okay, everybody? And we did."
However, Sacchi's most surprising enemy was not Brera, but was hiding in his own dressing room: Marco van Basten. Known to all, the relationship between the two was not good. So much so that the Dutchman often questioned him in front of the group. Sometimes he found it hard to see the logic in his coach's approach, and so he let him know. "Van Basten asked me why the others were winning and why we had to win and convince them. He also told me that we worked too hard and didn't have any fun. I always told him: 'You're a clever boy and you have to have fun in a different way. We're here to make sure the audience has a good time. He never understood that you can't get a lot without giving a lot. Van Basten has been an extraordinary player for me, not easy to manage, but extraordinary," says Sacchi. Years after their paths diverged, Sacchi and van Basten crossed paths again and the Dutchman acknowledged his mistakes: "When World Soccer recognised not too long ago that Milan had been the best team of all time, from when football existed, I said to him: 'Did you understand why we had to win and convince? And he said: 'I understood. And I understood something else too. Now I am a coach and I understand how many problems I created for you". And I said to him: "If I can console you, I didn't solve many of them." Nevertheless, Sacchi admits that he wouldn't have swapped van Basten for any other player, either of the time or of the present. "When they tell me 'between Ronaldo and van Basten who would you have signed,' I have no doubt: van Basten. But not because van Basten was more talented than Ronaldo, but because he was more functional in terms of our style of football and was a professional who gave more guarantees than Ronaldo, who was an unimaginable talent."
While the estrangement with Marco van Basten was evident, Sacchi had a close relationship with another Dutchman in the team: Ruud Gullit. He was his main support in the dressing room and the player through whom he injected his philosophy to the rest of the players. "Gullit was considered the emblem, for me he was a phenomenal player and an extraordinary person; probably the one who helped me the most without being the best, because the best was van Basten, but he had personality while van Basten hid himself, he was discontinuous. Gullit helped me a lot in making Italian players who always ran backwards run forward. He was the most convinced of this," he says. Sacchi changed the philosophy of Italian football, but Gullit transformed the philosophy of the Milan dressing room. The combination of the two Italian players made Rinus Michels' total football a success, building a Milan that would go down in history.

05. Revolutionary without revolution

After winning everything with Milan, he took over the reins of the Italian national team with whom he was second in the 1994 World Cup. He then went through an erratic career with a brief return to Milan and a few stints with Atletico Madrid and Parma before making the jump to the offices. With the perspective of his entire career, it's time to ask the same question as at the start: what was Italian football like before Sacchi? How have things changed since his revolution? Sacchi himself answers: "There has clearly been some change, but it is not linked to globalisation. Capello said it: 'We've rediscovered the Libero'. Most teams play with a fixed sweeper in the back." With Sacchi, Italian football learned that everyone must defend and attack as one, as a whole, without the previous attack-defence division. But it has forgotten everything else, and that takes its toll in Europe: "More and more we are getting slapped around and then we say: 'Why don't we spend? Why don't we use more start-up money? Then it happens that Borussia Dortmund reach the final and spend less than most of the big Italian teams or that Atletico Madrid reach the final of Champions and spend less. Our clubs are full of foreigners, full of fear, full of an eminently defensive football, playing with a sweeper. Then the result when they play at international level, where they find themselves with one less player in midfield or in attack, with the rival having players of level and leaving the ball and the initiative to them... well, they put you in difficulties".
"Also because outside the country, in general, they're much better at attacking than defending. So, if you want to put them in trouble, you have to attack them, not stop their attack. But all this requires work, organization, time, planning, programming and less improvised teams, teams that make some sense. What does a sense mean? Putting each value in its place. Since we are talking about a team sport, let's start with what unites the team: the game. What is the game about? From ideas and work. And without ideas and work, you don't have the game. If you don't have the game you rely only on individuals, and no individuality will ever have the power of a team. In some teams, this tendency to improvise - which we call fantasy - causes total disorganisation, with the consequence of losing the team," he adds to close a precise X-ray of the ills that Italian football is suffering from. Three decades after the birth of Sacchi's Milan, Italy has forgotten everything it has learned. There is no trace of the game with high pressure, offside is just another resource and even the sweeper, whose assassination triggered everything, has come back to life. Sacchi is a revolutionary without revolution. No one has been able to pick up on his witness. Italy has forgotten him, but football hasn't. Football just cannot forget the creator of one of the best teams in its history.
by Massimo Callegari & Francisco Orti for El Enganche.es (2016).
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2020.01.27 16:08 AGF435 Toxicity de Soad

Hey banda
¿Como andan? Espero que muy bien.
Estos últimos 3 días estuve escuchando el disco Toxicity de System Of A Down (hace años no escuchaba a esa banda) y me enganche bastante.Les dejo la playlist del album en YT del canal de la banda para que lo escuchen.
Cual es su opinión de este disco y de esta banda en si?
Un Saludo y buen Lunes.
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=OLAK5uy\_m6oaQI2D2rBtqK\_v28eQr-q2dZ-ugijuc
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2019.12.27 08:05 MrDecros [Serio] Recomendenme un juego de mesa

Buenas!
Resulta que tengo ganas hace rato de conseguir algún juego de mesa copado para jugar los domingos cuando se arma asado y estamos todos los primos al pedo, o cuando sale juntada en alguna casa con los amigos de la facu y estamos al pedo tmb.
Por juego de mesa copado me refiero a uno que salga del típico "Pictionary" "Monopoly" "TEG" etc que siempre la gente tiene x ahí, esos casi todo el mundo los aborrece (sin ofender a los que se ceban con ellos)
Lo que ando buscando sería un juego que dependa lo menor posible del azar, o sea está bueno que tenga un toque porque lo hace mucho más rejugable, pero me dan paja esos juegos dónde sentís que no importa un choto lo q hagas si el dado no sale lo que querés/necesitas (por ejemplo el TEG, bien podes tener 5 ejércitos y atacar a un país que tiene 1, pero si tu oponente saca 6 te jodiste, y si saca varias veces te jodiste en grande, se siente una mierda la verdad).
Mucha gente está cebada con el Catán, el cual no he jugado, pero me han dicho que tiene también ciertos problemas con los dados. (Además que me gustaría comprar un juego que x ahí nadie tenga, así hay variedad llegado el caso)
Estuve viendo varios videos en Youtube, hay muchísimos juegos distintos asique estoy medio perdido, pero lo que puedo llegar a decir es que no me importa mucho si es competitivo o cooperativo, mientras sea entretenido y te enganche.
También la onda sería que se pueda jugar casualmente, o sea nada de esos juegos que tenés q estar 1 hora para explicar las reglas nomás (me encantaría jugar algo así, pero la gente se embola al toque)
Por último si es un juego que dura una hora o 2 estaria genial, para no cansarse o que se sienta demasiado corto, pero esto sería lo de menos.
Les doy un ejemplo de un juego que casi compro, pero el precio se fue al joraca y me pareció que capaz consigo algo más copado x la misma plata, se llama Azul: Vitrales de Cintra.
Cómo nota adicional medio me ceban los juegos de deckbuilding pero no sé si habrá alguna que me calce justo.
Desde ya gracias x la ayuda!
Edit: Primero que nada muchas gracias a todos x la ayuda! Se re coparon y me dieron una bocha de consejos/sugerencias. Los quiero redditurros.
Segundo: vi que varios me recomendaron ir a algún lugar a probarlos, lastimosamente soy de Mendoza entonces se me complica ir a dónde me dijeron, pero acá encontré varios lugares donde se juntan a vejugar juegos de mesa, seguro me acerco a ver q onda!
Perdón si no les puedo contestar 1 por uno, pero sepan que leí todos los comentarios!
Ahora me toca ponerme a ver bien cada recomendación para decidir o ver qué onda!
De nuevo muchas gracias!
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2019.01.16 08:37 TheRetiredPlaymaker [OC] Cruyffism through Spain

Spain has developed a unique commitment to technical football which has put them in good stead to make the past decade a period of Spanish dominance. The story to this dominance begin decades before hand when Cruyff decided that Barcelona would be the club he would next manage after his time at Ajax was over. He would create a cohesive identity for the club which kept the vision while finding success. This vision began with a number of manager who came before Cruyff but after Cruyff left, there would be many managers in Spain who would use his methods to discovery their own success.
In this write up, I will explain what truly set Cruyff apart from his predecessors and show what his predecessors brought to Barcelona (the pre-Cruyffians). Then I will explain how Cruyff influenced a set of managers in the years to come (post Cruyffians). In between these three parts will be sections that explain what was happening around Spain throughout those years to give context to the greater development of Spanish tactical football in those years (these sections will not be as detailed and can be skipped while still maintaining the key aspects of the story).
Pre-Cruyffian’s of Barca
It may seem obvious to say but Catalonia does not only have an identity which is separate to the rest of Spain, but they seem to actively strive to set themselves apart from the state which reigns over them. In football terms, this is not an unusual or new phenomenon. FC Barcelona’s board of directors actively employed foreign and unique managers throughout the 70s and 80s who would implement a different style of attacking football compared to the rest of Spain. While these managers all came from very different backgrounds and had different visions for football, there was a notable similarity between these managers which would change with arrival of Cruyff. That is why I will refer to them as the pre-Cruyffians:
Vic Buckingham (1969-71), an Englishman who found his fame abroad, was employed at Barcelona after his stints at Ajax. His time at Ajax showed that he could nurture talent while also implementing a style of short passing football that Barcelona showed an interest in on numerous occasions. It can be speculated that Buckingham took this style of football from Arthur Rowe’s early development of the ‘give and go’ at Spurs in the 1940s (the club which Buckingham spent most of his playing career). He practiced this game at Ajax where he found a teenage Cruyff playing and picked him out as a special talent and would later give him his debut with Ajax. Buckingham left Ajax with a title but not much else, eventually he made his way to Barcelona where he would find limited success.
Michels (1971-75, 1976-78) would not only follow on from where Buckingham left off at Ajax, creating total football, but would also replace him at Barcelona where Michels would find significantly more success at both clubs. Michels won four titles at Ajax and one at Barcelona (along with a Copa del Rey during his second stint), making his time at Barcelona impressive but not era defining like his time with Ajax. At Ajax, he had brought about fluid attacking which saw players swap positions, something which was only seen with the other great sides like il grande torino. Again, Cruyff was a student of Michels, like he was of Buckingham, so he would learn from his success’s in the Netherlands while also what changed at Barcelona. Michels Barca playing against Feyenoord
Menotti (1983-84) can be seen as the third notable pre-Cruyffian to come to Barcelona winning a solitary Copa Del Rey win during his reign. Menotti was a great argentine coach who brought in a unique south American style, playing a 4312 which guaranteed a certain amount of flair and beauty which he had instilled in the Argentinian League as well as at the national team. However, Spanish football would show the dents in his armour as La Liga football appeared to be too fast for his liking. His team seemed like it was always just a few seconds away from doing something extraordinary, but the other sides were not going to give them that kind of respect or time. Maradona’s frustration was remarkably shown during his outburst during his final game at Barcelona. Menotti’s Barca playing Man United
There were other managers in this period who were not ideologues like those previously named but still had the same issue which all the others shared. Helenio Herrera was brought back to the club, after his time with Inter, to see a second stint at Barcelona and a third, both being unimpressive. Udo Lattek was employed, making him the second great German manager at Barcelona (Weisweiler being the first), and won the cup winners cup with his focus being on the players being physically prepared while he would be tactically simplistic. Lattek would allow the players to have some freedom on the pitch when it came to systems, player roles and tactics.
Section 1
The non-Barcelona coach who I will mention here is not someone I would call a pre-Cruyffian but is somewhat a precursor in terms of effect on their club and success in Spain. Miguel Muñoz won 9 titles and 2 Champions leagues at Real Madrid, so was actually more successful than Cruyff. He was another attacking coach, but he came from Spain and had dominated the league during the time of Di Stefano and Puskas. His style could be best described as directed chaos by pointing Real Madrid’s generational talents at the opposition and watching them smash down any obstacle. Munoz did have some structure as he implemented the 1-2 passing style that would allow his talented players to make their way up the pitch with some forward momentum. The squad was filled with the best players in the world who could outclass any opposition technically, so it made sense to allow them the room to do so. Munoz was able to work with the established club that was Real Madrid and facilitate the ability of world class players rather than build up to an idea. Real Madrid were still an incredible team during the 1950s and 60s and Munoz was the man who was there for much of their success.
However, Munoz came from a different time and would have shared the same issues as the pre-Cruyffians if he had inherited the same squad as them but used the same style of play. Their universal issue when it came to their approach to Spanish football was that they lacked a clear and concise game plan when it came to attacking the opposition. While Buckingham, Menotti and Michels all were attacking coaches, none of them limited their players in the attacking section of the pitch. Their ideologies were about giving the players room and flexibility in their attacking and allowing them to be the best player possible while entertaining the crowd. That is not what Cruyff was about.
What made Cruyff different?
For this analysis, Cruyff will be seen as he pivots by which we view Spain’s cultural football shift. His impact goes beyond the simple tactical effects but also into development of youth players as well as how fans view football clubs. However, we can start with the tactical outlook which Cruyff introduced in the 90s with his 3-4-3 at Barcelona. He made himself differ from the attacking coaches of the past by have some recognised rules which were held over the team as religiously as a defensive coach would train defensive positioning. The key rule (the one which Guardiola certainly holds sacrosanct) is the need to have a numerical advantage in both the midfield and defence. Cruyff was not an ideologue, as he wanted to win, but he would have certain tenets which he would maintain when he had strayed outside of the pale. He believed that these rules were the direct methods to give him the best chance of winning game. Along with his believe in an extra man, he would also stress the need to control the game by having possession of the ball. With that possession, the ball could be moved forward using the ideas which Buckingham had passed to Cruyff: that after a player passes, he must then make a run which provides an option for the ballcarrier. While these rules seem somewhat simple by modern standards, they were just the basis for what Cruyff would create at Barcelona. They brought the club to a run of league titles and a champions league win that would define an era for Barcelona in a way which they had not seen for years.
He swapped from the Dutch 433 to a 343 (diamond) when arriving at Barcelona but this would require very specific personnel. Cruyff’s defenders would need to be agile and mobile so that they could cope with the high line that comes with possession play. An intelligent defensive midfielder would be needed who could both stop opposition counters while still connect the midfield and defence when transitioning to attack (giving the defence a passing option at all times). The two central midfielders would be needed to create further passing options while also making the runs to support the attack. The attacking midfield would complete the midfield diamond, staggering out the midfielders between the opponent’s line in a way which allowed for more progressive passing options. The wingers were needed to create as much width as possible (as the centre backs would be positioned in a very wide fashion to make up for the absence of traditional full backs). These wingers could make runs to the inside but only if they had the ball on the wing and passed the ball to the centre (creating a run that would manipulate the shape of the opposition defensive line). The striker would mainly act as a target but needed to have decent ability when it came to passing and receiving the ball. Many driven passes would be aimed at him, either using him as a bouncing board to connect with another player or to challenge the opposition defenders. The main goal of Cruyff’s team was to manipulate the oppositions shape, finding space that a runner could exploit. The 3-4-3 and the roles which each player had would create a new passing map, rarely seen in football before, which had many different horizontal layers for moving the ball forward and creating passing options.
Section 2
This approach would play off the defensive approach of some of the teams from La Liga in the 80s, Athletic Bilboa being one of them. Javier Clemente would win a double and two league titles with Athletic Bilboa over his time at the club by playing a defensively focused game. Bilboa was an industrial city, so Clement made the team match the local mentality of being diligent on pitch (helped further by the clubs recruitment policy which would see extremely loyal and committed players signed from the local regions – something which Bielsa would later run with when employed at the club). They were not tactically complex as they would play an aggressive man marking system which used the traditional stoppelibero four man defence. Instead there was a focus on outworking the opposition, even disregarding the need to be technically flashy to win. Clemente wanted his players to stifle the opponents talented players and counter with the pacey wingers or send a long ball to the strikers. Often times they were reckless in their structure due to their workrate and man marking system, something which would be easily foiled by the positional play of Barcelona during the 90s. Any space exposed would have been exploited if a man marker vacated it. However, against the pre-Cruyffians this approach would starve the attackers of options and space as they did not have the right passing map or instructions to deal with it. Clemente’s Bilboa closing down Maradona
In game, Cruyff’s team would always have the wide options to pass to. This was a necessity to pull the defence apart and make use of space that would be present on the less populated wing positions. The deepest midfielder would often act like the metronome for the team (something which Menotti often player with), keeping the ball moving to the wide positions if the forward pass was not on. The three centre backs would need to be positioned in extremely wide manner to allow the wingers to take such positions while also making sure that they covered the area behind the high backline. Nevertheless, Cruyff was more interested in attacking and was gifted with Ronald Koeman, the midfielder who played in defence, whose passing ability gave his extra man in at the back an excellent platform to start build up play. This passing ability was instilled in most positions on the pitch and only improved as Cruyff grew into the club, with players becoming more and more comfortable making incisive passes which the commentators in the stands could barely see, no matter the average player on the pitch. Cruyff would train his team to be a cohesive unit that understood the need for technical ability but, more importantly, intelligence in movement and positioning. The players would become familiar with their teammates runs and natural position on a near psychic level, making it easier their colleagues to predict where each man would be.
One of the most important aspects of Cruyff was his self-awareness, tactically. He knew he was strict and this could lead to a formulaic form of attacking which could be predicted and if something can be predicted then it can be prepared for. So Cruyff ended up buying players like Laudrap, Stoichov and Romario over his years at the club with each playing in different areas of the pitch. What was important about these players was their irresistible flair which could amaze the crowds and bewilder defenders. Their addition to the team meant that Barcelona were never without a surprise. Football is not an exact science, even if you have more possession, create dangerous chances and defend well, there’s still a possibility of losing. Cruyff’s flair players were seen as the antidote to this eventuality. They prevented Barcelona from being to formulaic but were also the safeguard against the unexpected due to their own ability to do the impossible.
The Dutchman also had a focus on youth development which saw the club instil a set of values in the youth teams which matched the first team’s. This meant teaching them the tenets of positional play and creating intelligent footballers. Additionally, Johan was very connected with the Catalonian people and loved the city of Barcelona. Therefore, he wanted the club to give back to the community and have sure that there was a connection and honesty that the club could be admired and set an example. Even after his retirement, he would play a big role in overseeing the clubs progress and making sure there was a consistent plan to build on. Cruyff’s Barca 1993/94
Van Gaal would continue Cruyff’s work at Barcelona by replicating the same level of success which came before, as well as keeping to a strict and complex approach to attacking football. He did return to playing 433 with a slower mentality when holding possession than Cruyff but he strove for a greater level of footballing perfection than Cruyff did. Van Gaal was also not as self-aware as Cruyff when looking at his own approach to the game as he would continuously view his system as an attempt to create perfection. If Cruyff was an ideologue, then Van Gaal was an extremist ready to die for his cause. His system would change from club to club, but his ideas and his approach were unrelenting in the face of whatever challenge he was faced with and, to be fair, he is an incredibly successful manager. There is a feeling that he may have viewed himself as being in Cruyff shadow, making him believe that he would need to set himself apart from Cruyff. This led to an on and off feud between the two Dutchmen, despite them both having more in common than other managers that they befriended in their careers.
A notable aspect of Van Gaal approach was how he would break down football into four parts, attacking, defence and the transitions between those stages. By doing this he was able have a more structure view of the game and how to approach training and tactical changes. Most importantly, it allowed for a quick method of breaking down how the opposition played by looking at how they would approach each stage of the game. Did they want to have a very quick transition between defence and attack through counter and did that phase often occur on the wings? You would be able to see this is you just watched what happened when the opposition won the ball (Defence to Offence transition). Personally, breaking the game down like this is how I analyse football and allows for a quick interpretation of how a game is going on a shallow tactical level.
Section 3
Despite Cruyff and Van Gaal showing the Spanish a completely new method for attacking, it would take time before these ideas were widely cultivated into the mainstream. After Cruyff, it was Vincente Del Bosque who brought Real Madrid into the limelight again, dominating Europe with his tactical flexibility. Del Bosque was more focused on man-management than on the tactical nuances of the game, which proved extremely successful with the individual talent available to Real Madrid. There was a slight difference to the Munoz era, as they relied on a certain level of defensive competence, with the squad having some legendary names at the back. Makelele would define the position of defensive midfielder during his times at Real Madrid and Chelsea while Hierro gain legend status even amongst the fickle supporter base. Zidane would take a similar approach during his time as Real manager, prioritising the man management of egos and making tactical decisions based on that situation. Real Madrid winning the Champions League against Leverkusen
Section 4
Along with Vincente Del Bosque, the defensive manager returned to Spain to take the less renowned La Liga teams to success. Rafa Benitez and Javier Irureta were the two coaches who revolutionised the 4-2-3-1 during the 2000s with Valencia and Deportivo respectively. Benitez would help Valencia to a title and European glory by making the distinction between the attacking midfielder and the second strikers used in a 4-2-3-1. Most 4-2-3-1 would use a second striker, making it a glorified 4-4-2 but Benitez played an out and out attacking midfielder who participated as part of the midfield unit rather than working off the striker. This meant that he could pack the midfield when defending by creating a 451 if necessary. Nevertheless, This Valencia team was very capable of attacking. There were clearly some lessons learned from Cruyff when looking at the teams attacking ability and the way that the formation Benitez used vertically stagger of players to have players between the defensive lines. This began with the deep-lying playmaker in the double pivot moving the ball towards the attacking midfield three who played both a creative and attacking role in the squad. Irureta was not an incredibly defensive coach but preferred making sure that he was solid at the back. His 4231 had a high press, unlike Benitez, and used the double pivot to protect against counters by having them retreat if the press failed. Deportivo’s double pivot would also contain two playmakers who could get the ball to the forward players effective and safely. The attacking midfielder in this team was played like an enganche, with attacks being filtered through his creativity. Benitez’s Valencia play Porto Irureta Depor play Real Madrid
The Next Step
The arrival of Pep Guardiola signalled the change which had been in the works for years. Rjikaard had been successful with Barcelona in the period between LVG and Pep but he had reverted the approach back to a less complex form of attacking football. Guardiola took the complexity of attacking to completely new level, one which had never been seen before, with clear inspiration from Cruyff and Van Gaal. The time was right for Barca in more ways than one though, as those years of Dutch influence had not only crafted the perfect manager for the style but had also cultivated the perfect club environment to harvest the right kind of youth product and technical coaching knowledge around FC Barcelona.
I don’t want to spend too much time on Guardiola, as there is so much material out there to be read about him, but I will lay out his part in the Cruyffian legacy. There were new rules which were implemented on top of those which Cruyff had established, with one the most notorious being the need to pass the ball 15 times in the defence to attack transition phase of the game. Pep viewed this as the theoretical minimum number of passes needed to establish the positional system for the team to start making the proper runs to displace defenders (did not mean Barca were not able to counter attack well, just an idea to demonstrate how Guardiola wanted his team positioned). Additionally, the counter press was employed to make sure that the control of the game was maximised in Barcelona’s favour. It worked on a five second rule, which saw the team press the ball intensely when possession was lost. The positional overloads which the team was creating when in possession of the ball would allow for the counter press to have a pre-established basis to limit the opposition ball winner’s space on the pitch. (The counter press can be seen just as much as an influence of Van Gaal and his view of transitions and positioning on the pitch.) A final important rule (theoretically) was earning the right to make a run into the box, meaning that a player had to contribute to the build-up play or create space to be exploited before they could make a run into the box. This made Barcelona a more effective team who only made runs when the opportunity was present (which is why there could be long spells of possession). While these ‘rules’ were in place, if there was space and room for the counter then the Barca players would take it.
Guardiola also built on the theoretical view of the game, by taking Van Gaal’s love of triangle between players and turning it into literal zones on the pitch to create the best variety of options for the players. This is where the use of the half-space would consciously become of utmost importance, with players like Xavi and Iniesta becoming masters of this area of the pitch. It was the area between the centre and wings of the pitch, mostly located in the opposition half, which gave midfielders the ability to create more connections with their teammates while also being able to see more of the pitch from a diagonal view point. This would also allow for diagonal progression up the pitch, which was viewed as the most effective way of moving the ball forward with speed around the opposition (Juego de Posición). This passing style was epitomised with Busquets, the perfect metronome in defence, the Catalonian whose father played for the club and the player who has almost created a whole new position in his career. The creation of triangles and links between players was furthered when Messi would drop into the infamous false nine position which allowed him to actively participate in the midfields build up play, confuse and drag defenders out of position while also creating room for the wingers to make inside runs. Messi would also be the creative flair player who could tear up the rule book if Barcelona did become too formulaic. Pep’s Barca beat Man United to the Champions League Pep’s Barca demolition of Real
Section 5
This style of play would rule the world for so long that it looked nearly unbeatable, until the German revolution sweep through European competitions and displaced the Spanish from their throne for a period of time. This was seen when Barcelona were demolition by Bayern Munich as the same happened to Real Madrid by the hand of Borrussia Dortmund. This was possible by creating a complex form of pressing football which could match the similarly complex form of positional play which the Spanish were playing with. Bayern and Dortmund were able to press the ball while also using the cover shadow of the pressers to prevent any new space from being presented behind the players while the presser’s teammates covered all other passing options. When Luis Enrique took the helm of the club after Tito Villanova, he would employ a more direct form of attacking football which departed from Barcelona’s previous ideals and he would bring in Neymar (a signing which fit in more with Real Madrid’s portfolio more than Barcelona’s). Despite their massive success, this was when Barcelona seemed to stray from, what most would have said, made them so iconic amongst the other legendary sides of the past.
The Post Cruyffians arrive (taking from Jonathan Wilson’s use of the word)
During and after Pep’s, the post-Cruyffian’s, those who took direct inspiration from Cruyff and his impact in Spain, began to appear in La Liga. While the pre-Cruyffians were confined to those who managed Barcelona, the post-Cruyffians can been seen as those who aspired to manager Barcelona, or at the very least want to create a similar culture and footballing style. These managers do diverge from Cruyff in their methodology and nuances when approaching football tactically and in coaching, but they take the spirit and the core beliefs which Cruyff established. I think you could split those managers into three groups when looking at world football:
-There are the Dutch products to this who come from an Ajax school of football (e.g. Koeman, De Boer)
-There are the Spanish products who take from the Barcelona school of football (e.g. Valverde, Queque Setien)
-There are then the rest of those who are inspired by Cruyff across the footballing world (e.g. Brendan Rodgers)
In my opinion, this set of managers did not take so long to appear simply due to the difficulties in understand the style of football. They needed a certain minimum standard of technical ability across the board, including goalkeepers, defenders and strikers. By the 2010s, Spain were producing a great number of technical footballers in all positions (even if many had deficiencies in other areas of their game). Once these footballers were being produced, a committed possession-based style was possible at a lower level club. These managers were then able to come in and play with the ideas which Cruyff had developed in the 90s.
However, the most interesting manager of the post-Cruyffian’s would have to be Jose Mourinho, the fallen angel of Barcelona football (as Jonathon Wilson describes him). He was a translator for Bobby Robson and then coach for Van Gaal at Barcelona where he learnt his trade before making the jump to a head coaching role. He was at Barcelona when players like Guardiola and Luis Enrique were players so was in the same environment as the coaches who would one day manage Barcelona. Mourinho takes the rules of Cruyffian football but he flipped the spirit of it by embracing a defensive style of football. The need for an extra man in the centre was no longer applied to passing options but applied to preventing overloads in defence by having an extra marker. He understood the goal of positional play was to misplace the opposition, so he made his teams extremely tight in their defensive structure when playing against the Barca style. Mourinho was so successful that he took Porto to the top European achievement of winning the Champions league. After his stint there and at Chelsea (where he did prove he could create a brand of attacking football in some form), he assumed that his next job would be with his first employer, Barcelona. They rejected him for Guardiola who was an unproven manager but also former player with Catalan heritage (everything Mourinho wasn’t). This relationship and his intimate knowledge of Cruyffian football was what made Mourinho the textbook foil to Guardiola and what he represented. He was the textbook foil not because of he was the opposite, but because he was the unwanted brother of the family.
Mourinho would prove his worth against Barcelona twice, once when at Inter Milan in the champions league, knocking Barca out and a second time at Real Madrid, where he set the new record points total for the Spanish League. Ironically in comparison to our current thoughts of Mourinho, when he played against Barcelona in the 2011-12 season he had his team play a relatively high line with a focus on prevent Barcelona’s midfield player from having the time to start their attacking transition. He also had his team snap into tackles if the Barcelona players tried to turn toward goal and would have the central midfielders marshal the mazy dribblers of the Barcelona team to the wings where they could not do as much damage. In attack, Mourinho did use Cruyffian method but applied them to counter attacking by having his players pass and move while also making sure that there were multiple options for the player when countering. This led to a 2-1 victory which seems like a reasonable result but for Mourinho it meant more than just the three points.
In some ways, Aragones should be seen as having a similar flip in spirit of the Cruyffian ideals when managing the Spanish National Team. His use of possession was defensive in a way which Cruyff understood but Aragones put a focus on it, which was not the original intent. His Spain team did not have an elite level ability to penetrate a defensive line but could kill the opposition with continuous safe passing. Spain’s lack of penetration could be brought down to the limited amount of time that a national team manager actually has to prepare with a squad (with most of the players being drawn from Barca and Real Madrid). This approach, at times, also focused on the need to have the individual talent to score the necessary goals or even take advantage of set pieces to progress at tournament level. However, this use of passing would become their downfall as the prevalence of the more organised pressing game would make it more difficult to play in this slow and methodical manner with additional difficulty of the defensive systems of Europe becoming accustomed to playing against Spain, understanding the need for a compact block which would not be easily moved by slow passing play designed to wait for a defender to lose his positioning. Spain win the World Cup
Section 6
Simeone was the most notable manager who used that compact 4-4-2 which looked very similar to the 4-4-2 of Mancini at Inter Milan or a Capello at AC Milan. This approach saw the wide players tuck in and the strikers drop to prevent the dreaded central overloads which Barca loved to exploit. Simeone was able to take Atletico Madrid to a La Liga trophy, two champions league finals, two Europa League win and a Copa Del Rey win through this playstyle. He would implement this approach mainly when playing against the bigger sides and switched to a more attractive brand of football when playing against lesser Spanish opposition. What was maybe more impressive was his ability to function on a budget which could never compete with the big two of Spain but was still able to keep things competitive over the years. His ability to improve and player is only as impressive as his ability to get a player motivated and instil a sense of loyalty in most of them. His Atletico side were remarkable hard working, committed and intelligent over the years despite sometimes having a huge talent gap when playing against the Barcas and Reals. Unia Emery would show a similar level of proficiency of competing on a limited budget with Valencia and Sevilla over the years, with Sevilla winning Europe League after Europa League during his tenure. Atletico win the Europa League
Conclusion
Cruyff was an anomaly. A world class player (probably one of the best of all time) who would translate his success to management and create a bigger influence after retirement than he would during his playing career. This was due to the fact that he was not just gifted with a create pair of feet but was clearly taught the game of football in manner that few will get to equal. It’s hard to find more ways to praise the man that have not already been written or said by those more eloquent than me.
So, I’ll focus on another area. Splitting this timeline into three (Pre-Cruyff/Cruyff and Post-Cruyff) can be slightly misrepresentative, with there being periods of time that I have tried to fill with the additional sections. What is more important than that is seeing the clear line of development in this style of play which inhabits such a huge role in modern football. This is a style that ran the world for years and still shows complete competence at winning league and impressing even the most stone-faced football fans. I don’t believe the development of this style is over, but I don’t see it changing anytime soon, as we are too close to the success and presence of Guardiola. To find the true introspective view of this playstyle and where it goes, you need to be able to look back on it with a clear mind that is unaffected by the biases held in looking at something from the present. Maybe once the players or viewers of Guardiola’s style have retired or matured and gained a new perspective, they can push the dialect forward, instead of creating insipid imitations.
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2018.02.23 19:07 StalinNoPants [REQUEST] Nota completa de C5N del post del motochorro de ayer tiene alto fail como para el podio

De los creadores de GANO SCIOLI POR AMPLIA DIFERENCIA, CHEVAFLECHA y GROG XD salió una joyita que no pude recolectar a mi colección y quería saber si algún rediturro lo alcanzo a ver.
Ayer haciendo zapping al medio día enganche la noticia del motochorro que lo cagaron a palos por C5N, así que lo dejé. La nota incompleta está acá. Después de un tiempo viendo la nota el tipo que pasaba el tape parece que se embolo de repetirlo mil veces, entonces minimiza el video, se ve la pantalla de windows con la carpeta de los videos, abre una ventana de Chrome y se pone a mostrar una publicación que seguramente él estaba viendo con una mina semi en pelotas. Tuve que cambiar y contenerme la risa porque estaba con la familia de mi novia que son medio rompe pero fue terrible lo impresentable de la situación.
Si alguno lo pudo enganchar me gustaría añadirlo a mi colección de fails de C5N
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